| Item type |
学術雑誌論文 / Journal Article.(1) |
| 公開日 |
2016-09-13 |
| 書誌情報 |
en : Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications
巻 9,
号 4,
p. 692-711,
発行日 2016-07
|
| タイトル |
|
|
タイトル |
An incentive game based evolutionary model for crowd sensing networks |
|
言語 |
en |
| 言語 |
|
|
言語 |
eng |
| キーワード |
|
|
言語 |
en |
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Game model |
| キーワード |
|
|
言語 |
en |
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Incentive mechanism |
| キーワード |
|
|
言語 |
en |
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Cooperation rates |
| キーワード |
|
|
言語 |
en |
|
主題Scheme |
Other |
|
主題 |
Crowd sensing networks |
| 資源タイプ |
|
|
資源タイプ識別子 |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 |
|
資源タイプ |
journal article |
| アクセス権 |
|
|
アクセス権 |
open access |
|
アクセス権URI |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
| 著者 |
LIU, Xiao
太田, 香
LIU, Anfeng
CHEN, Zhigang
|
| 室蘭工業大学研究者データベースへのリンク |
|
|
表示名 |
太田 香（OTA Kaoru） |
|
URL |
http://rdsoran.muroran-it.ac.jp/html/100000140_ja.html |
| 抄録 |
|
|
内容記述タイプ |
Abstract |
|
内容記述 |
Crowd sensing networks can be used for large scale sensing of the physical world or other information service by leveraging the available sensors on the phones. The collector hopes to collect as much as sensed data at relatively low cost. However, the sensing participants want to earn much money at low cost. This paper examines the evolutionary process among participants sensing networks and proposes an evolutionary game model to depict collaborative game phenomenon in the crowd sensing networks based on the principles of game theory in economics. A effectively incentive mechanism is established through corrected the penalty function of the game model accordance with the cooperation rates of the participant, and corrected the game times in accordance with it’s payoff. The collector controls the process of game by adjusting the price function. We find that the proposed incentive game based evolutionary model can help decision makers simulate evolutionary process under various scenarios. The crowd sensing networks structure significantly influence cooperation ratio and the total number of participant involved in the game, and the distribution of population with different game strategy. Through evolutionary game model, the manager can select an optimal price to facilitate the system reach equilibrium state quickly, and get the number of participants involved in the game. The incentive game based evolutionary model in crowd sensing networks provides valuable decision-making support to managers. |
|
言語 |
en |
| 出版者 |
|
|
出版者 |
springer |
|
言語 |
en |
| 出版者版へのリンク |
|
|
表示名 |
10.1007/s12083-015-0342-2 |
|
URL |
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12083-015-0342-2 |
| DOI |
|
|
関連タイプ |
isVersionOf |
|
|
識別子タイプ |
DOI |
|
|
関連識別子 |
10.1007/s12083-015-0342-2 |
| 日本十進分類法 |
|
|
主題Scheme |
NDC |
|
主題 |
007.7 |
| ISSN |
|
|
収録物識別子タイプ |
PISSN |
|
収録物識別子 |
1936-6442 |
| ISSN |
|
|
収録物識別子タイプ |
EISSN |
|
収録物識別子 |
1936-6450 |
| 書誌レコードID |
|
|
収録物識別子タイプ |
NCID |
|
収録物識別子 |
AA1252589X |
| 権利 |
|
|
言語 |
en |
|
権利情報 |
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12083-015-0342-2 |
| 著者版フラグ |
|
|
出版タイプ |
AM |
|
出版タイプResource |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa |
| フォーマット |
|
|
内容記述タイプ |
Other |
|
内容記述 |
application/pdf |
PPNA_9-4_692-711 (1.2 MB)
